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Hashing and Encrypting Public Unsecured Datasets for Secure Dataset Fingerprinting 
ABSTRACT 
There are a number of public unsecured datasets (PUDs) that include data from users of 
social media service providers or other entities. Such service providers and other organizations 
are often called upon to retrieve and secure PUDs. There are certain difficulties that arise, e.g., 
verifying that the PUD includes data from that organization and not any other; handling the data 
so that personnel from the organization or its vendors cannot access or use it for unauthorized 
purposes; efficiently analyzing the PUD; etc.  
This disclosure describes secure procedures for handling PUD data using keyed hashing-
and-encryption functions such that an organization can efficiently determine whether it was (or 
was not) the origin of the PUD data without individuals affiliated to the organization, e.g., 
employees or vendors, gaining access to the plaintext PUD data.  
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BACKGROUND 
There are a number of public unsecured datasets (PUDs) that include data from users of 
social media service providers or other entities. Such service providers and other organizations 
are often called upon to retrieve and secure PUDs. There are certain difficulties that arise, e.g., 
verifying that the PUD includes data from that organization and not any other; handling the data 
so that personnel from the organization or its vendors cannot access or use it for unauthorized 
purposes; efficiently analyzing the PUD; etc.  
There are a number of public unsecured datasets (PUDs) that include data from users of 
social media service providers or other entities. Although data within a user’s account at such 
services is generally secure, public accessibility of portions of this data outside of the service 
provider poses a risk to both consumers and to the service provider. Such service providers and 
other organizations are often called upon to retrieve and secure PUDs, for which they may 
employ third-party vendors. 
There are certain difficulties that arise during this process, as described below: 
Mixed datasets: When a service provider is notified of PUDs that may contain unknown records 
of personally identifiable information (PII) or user identifiable information (UII), it is not 
possible to a priori determine conclusively whether the PUD includes PII/UII data specifically 
from that provider or from other organizations. An organization typically verifies that the PUD 
did originate from itself, prior to ingesting, uploading, or analyzing such PUD. 
Data Security: During the data-handling procedures used to secure PUDs, potential risks arise as 
follows: 
● Reading of unencrypted PII/UII data by a vendor or anyone else in the chain of PUD 
acquisition and transmittal to the organization. 
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● Indefinite storage of PUD data by vendors. 
● Usage of PUD data acquired on behalf of the organization for unauthorized purposes. 
● Disclosure of PII/UII through potential vendor breaches. 
● Access of PUD by employees without business need or authorization. 
● Use of PUD data for purposes other than protecting privacy. 
● Storage of PUD data originating from one organization by another organization.  
● Storage of data from deleted accounts. 
Efficient analysis of datasets: Upon identifying a large PUD, it is efficient to determine whether 
the dataset is a recurrence of a previous one or is a novel dataset with new records. This also 
enables the determination of possible causes for the dataset exposure, such as whether the data 




Fig. 1: Procedure for handling PUD datasets in a secure manner  
 Per the techniques of this disclosure, illustrated in Fig. 1, to improve privacy protection 
for user data and to minimize risks for an organization and for its third-party vendors when 
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handling PUDs, a specific procedure for handling any datasets ingested into the organization is 
utilized.  
Vendor dataset acquisition: The vendor hashes and encrypts PUD data upon retrieving the data 
prior to storing it on disk. Each individual datapoint, e.g., each value in a PUD record, is hashed 














Fig. 2: (a) A (synthetic) record of user data in plaintext; (b) The record after processing with an 
HMAC function. After HMAC processing, the record is essentially indecipherable. 
  Fig. 2, which illustrates HMAC operation on a record of user data, shows that processing 
by an HMAC function renders a user record in the PUD essentially indecipherable. The HMAC 
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function is deterministic, e.g., given the same input, it produces the same output. It is also 
irreversible, e.g., given the output of an HMAC function, it is not computationally feasible to 
recover its input. Although an HMAC function disables the viewing of plaintext data by humans, 
it enables the comparison of two datasets, e.g., to determine if two hashed-and-encrypted 
datasets are identical or not. 
Dataset transfer to the organization: The organization performs intermediate storage of the 
hashed and encrypted data for a limited amount of time, e.g., ninety days, in a data warehouse. 
The limited data retention serves as an additional measure of data security.  
Fingerprinting and dataset analysis: A fast, accurate fingerprint of the just-acquired dataset is 
computed. By comparing the fingerprint of the just-acquired PUD against a PUD-fingerprint 
archive, analysts can determine whether there are any data, e.g., user IDs, emails, names, 
usernames, phone numbers, etc., in the PUD that likely originate from the organization. Non-
organizational data or data from deleted accounts are filtered out. Metadata and aggregate 
statistics, e.g., number of users in the PUD, distribution of the age of the accounts, distribution of 
the country of the accounts, etc., can be stored in a data warehouse with suitable access controls. 
Aggregate statistics enable the organization to accurately respond to data protection agencies.  
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Fig. 3: Testing hashed-and-encrypted records for matches  
 Fig. 3 illustrates the testing of hashed-and-encrypted records for matches. User data held 
by the organization is effectively hashed and encrypted using an HMAC function with a key, and 
compared with the hashed-and-encrypted PUD data to detect a match. In this manner, PUD data 
that originated from the organization can be discovered without any human user having access to 
plaintext PUD data. The use of HMAC functions, per the techniques of this disclosure, protect 
data from being used for unauthorized purposes that may not preserve data privacy. Also, 
subjecting data to HMAC processing ensures that the data is protected in the event of a breach.  
In this manner, the techniques of this disclosure enable any service provider or 
organization that holds user data to engage with third-party vendors to proactively identify, 
acquire, and analyze PUDs that may include organizational or user data. The techniques enable 
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organizations to build data-handling procedures and tools that protect user privacy, and fortify 
controls around the data during the time it may be handled by third-party vendors and ingested 
into the organization. The techniques also enable quick analysis of the data to determine if the 
PUD originated from the organization, and if so, the proper ways of handling it. For example, a 
service provider that discovers data pertaining to a user in a PUD can inform that user of the data 
breach and/or take other mitigating actions.  
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes secure procedures for handling PUD data using keyed hashing-
and-encryption functions such that an organization can efficiently determine whether it was (or 
was not) the origin of the PUD data without individuals affiliated to the organization, e.g., 
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